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In the early part of the 20th century, phys-
icswas in themiddle of a revolution. Novel
methods for measuring infinitesimal parti-
cles and macro-scale forces were gener-
ating unique new data. Computational
advances, such as the theory of relativity,
provided new frameworks for under-
standing these findings. Put simply,
physics was the place to be for scientific
revolutions in 1915.
One hundred years later, neuroscience
is having a similar moment. The revolution
in genetic engineering and determination
of the molecular and cellular machinery
underlying neural communication has led
to several recent Nobel prizes. Advances
in molecular and cellular biology have
paved the way for understanding funda-
mentals of the nervous system, from neu-
rogenesis to programmed cell death to
circuit dynamics, based on the study of in-
vertebrates such as flies, worms, and
crabs. Such models are essential for
continued innovation in understanding
biology and in testing methods for
broader application across phylogenetic
levels.
At the other end of the spectrum, the in-
vention of methods for imaging human
brains non-invasively has provided a
transformative advance in discovering
basic features of its systems-level organi-
zation, a macro-scale road map for
understanding perception, action, and
cognition. The recent over billion-euro
‘‘Human Brain Project’’ and subsequent
United States ‘‘BRAIN’’ Initiative have
called for a similar revolution at the meso
level between these two scales, focusing
investigation on the activity and connec-tivity of extensive systems of neurons.
This effort is well served by a variety of
recent innovations in genetic targeting of
cell types and new optical methods that
allow control and recording from large
numbers of specific neurons in animal
models, particularly mice.
Scientific interest in understanding this
meso scale—how circuits and systems
of areas compute to serve biological
information processing—has many moti-
vations. First, such operations are inter-
esting in their own right, as an example
of how biological elements can work
together to process information. Such
information provides not only insight
into biology, but also inspiration for
artificial intelligence and computational
architectures.
Second, the meso scale is particularly
informative for basic understanding of
how complex human cognition emerges
from neural computation. Viewed from a
clinical perspective, the goal of improving
human brain health requires understand-
ing not only the micro scale of what
genes and epigenetic factors underlie
normal function, but how these factors
alter the network-level interactions that
are widely regarded as the proximal neu-
ral events underlying behavior. On the
basic science side, if we seek to funda-
mentally understand the human condi-
tion—why we are who we are—then the
meso level of analysis is an essential
part of the answer that science can pro-
vide, and we have a unique new opportu-
nity to pursue it.
Yet, investigation at the meso scale
cannot provide the whole answer. If one
is concerned with human brain func-Neuron 88,tion—whether as a funding agency, as a
research institution, or as a scientist—
concrete links must be made between
animal model systems and the complex
human system. Our view is that these
links can only be achieved by active,
direct interaction between human and
non-human neuroscience research.
Failing to substantiate that meso-scale
neural processes in animal models paral-
lel those underlying human functions
can easily lead to false inferences.
Conversely, failing to ground human
neuroscience in basic biological princi-
ples—only addressable in animal
models—may result in descriptive ab-
stractions that lead to theoretical dead-
ends. Yet, these direct links seldom occur
spontaneously and must be directly
sought. We elaborate these issues and
propose specific steps to increase the
probability of such connections.
Why Isolated Work at the Meso
Level Is Insufficient if the Goal Is
Understanding Human Brain
Function in Health and Disease
As stated above, the meso-scale revolu-
tion provides an exciting opportunity; it
is hard to overstate the potential gains
that will come from in vivo work in animal
models at all levels. However, a common
assumption is that animal models provide
an example, albeit in miniature, of the
same principles that apply for analogous
computations in humans. This linear or
‘‘strong’’ reductionist assumption is often
flawed for many reasons.
First, emergence of more complex
behavior from simpler systems—even if
we understood all the rules in suchDecember 2, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 855
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a colloquial example, consider the game
of chess. An individual can readily learn
all the rules of chess, as there are only
a few dozen. Yet, the emergent tree of
games arising from these rules is so
vast that human players have never ex-
hausted its branches. Indeed, it is only
by having a relatively detailed model of
the typical course of a game—and, in
the case of experts, the strategies they
employ—that one can understand and
make predictions about the behavior
that will unfold in any specific instance
(Holland, 1999).
Such attempts to infer more complex
systems from reductionistic information
present an even thornier challenge in
biology, where we are unsure of the
rules themselves, much less their com-
plex, emergent realization. A salient
example comes from genetics. We have
sequenced the entire human genome,
yet the complex biochemical interactions
that the system undergoes to produce
specific features in a developed organism
are still challenging to predict. The rapidly
growing field of epigenetics is largely
predicated on addressing this problem.
Thus, understanding such complex sys-
tems is crucially dependent on identifying
the properties of the existing system
(watching a game of chess or fully charac-
terizing a phenotypic expression) and
then trying to describe how rules combine
to produce that system.
The emergence problem holds within
strictly human neuroscience as well.
Even if we could feasibly conduct meso-
level research in the human brain, one
would still have to understand how
lower-level biological variables (e.g.,
spike rates in neuronal subtypes) interact
with each other, how they are influenced
by higher-level variables (e.g., coordi-
nated synchrony across regions), and
within a dynamically changing environ-
ment to explain everyday human func-
tioning. Animal neuroscience is often
posed as a means of studying the base-
level biological principles underlying hu-
man brain function. So, it becomes impor-
tant in these cases to demonstrate their
explanatory power directly in the com-
plex, human system. Doing so requires
coordination with human neuroscience.
As Norbert Wiener and Arturo Rose-
nblueth famously said, ‘‘the best material856 Neuron 88, December 2, 2015 ª2015 Elsmodel for a cat is another, preferably the
same one.’’ While the logical challenges
to emergence reflected in this quote and
in our above discussion are not cause
for defeatism in the use of reduced
models, they emphasize the need for
interaction. The need for interaction is
supported not only by logic, but also by
extensive data, as discussed in the next
section.
Wide-Ranging Examples of How
Inference from Mouse-Meso to
Humans Can Fail: Clinical Trials
In addition to the preceding logical chal-
lenge, there is substantial quantitative
data directly supporting the prediction
that biological principles determined only
in animal models often do not predict hu-
man responses, even when those models
are probed in detail at the meso level.
Phase II clinical trials are designed to
test treatments in humans that show
pre-clinical efficacy in animal models.
Often, these treatments derive from new
insights into the mechanistic biology of
disease processes in mice. Moreover,
their efficacy in animal models and prom-
ise is such that they lead corporations and
funding agencies to spend the millions of
dollars required to proceed to human
testing. In short, they have to be highly
promising based on these initial screens
to make it to this level of analysis.
Despite the prior thought and financial
investment required in such trials, they
fail far more often than not. Between
2008 and 2010, the success rate of such
trials was only 18%. Approximately 50%
of this failure rate was due to a lack of clin-
ical efficacy in humans, despite the well-
researched success in animal models
(Arrowsmith, 2011). Put simply, vetting
biology extensively, and introducing large
financial risk in treatment development,
still does not produce effective predic-
tions of how a drug will fare in humans.
The challenge of translational work is of
course not a reason to abandon animal
research. To gain the most value from
the indispensable contributions of animal
models, we must have a firm understand-
ing of their translation to the human. This
translation requires active, coordinated
human neuroscience research. We note
that similar arguments have been raised
by scientists in defense of the need for hu-
man stem cell lines in addition to animal
lines.evier Inc.Why Only Focusing on Human
Neuroscience Fails Logically and
Misses a Historic ScientificMoment
Just as focusing exclusively at the meso
scale is fundamentally limiting, transfor-
mative progress cannot be made simply
by studying the emergent, complex sys-
tem in humans. With an MRI scanner at
almost every institution, it is easy to forget
that the advent of accessible, non-
invasive human neuroimaging and neuro-
stimulation techniques was a historic
revolution in neuroscience. Yet, currently
available techniques have well-known
and significant limitations, not the least
of which is that they largely stop at the
macro scale. As such, these methods
provided limited data for a circuit-level of
description, and they are unable to
address questions related to cell-type-
specific functions within a region. These
differences can be critical to understand-
ing function, predicting behavior and its
modulations by pharmacological agents.
Thus, many of the biological premises on
which these complex systems are based
require testing in animal models at multi-
ple levels.
Why Cooperate Now?
A commonly asked question is whether
investments in progress in human neuro-
science should wait until further break-
throughs are made at the meso level.
This question denies logic in several
ways. Chief among these is that without
an integrated approach, we cannot know
if progress at the meso level applies in
the human, for the reasons stated above.
Similarly, there is much to gain from un-
derstanding the principles that govern
human cognition and behavior captured
by quantitative models, even if nothing is
known about neural mechanisms in
advance. For example, behavioral eco-
nomic models have provided constraints
on the utility functions employed in human
decision making and the ways in which
they handle uncertainty and delays (e.g.,
hyberbolic discounting). This approach
allows the animal researcher to identify
relevant targets to be explained in
terms of underlying mechanism. Indeed,
there are already several examples for
which cognitive and computational theory
derived from human cognitive and neu-
ral science has positively influenced
animal research (some other prominent
Neuron
NeuroViewexamples are described in Frank and
Badre, 2015).
A further practical consequence of self-
segregation into human- or animal-only
research programs is that without
conscious attempts to align efforts and
progress, human and non-human work
will continually diverge into their own
idiosyncratic subdomains and will
increasingly lose common ground for
communication, making prospects for
their eventual synthesis increasingly
remote. Perversely, the ‘‘parallel’’
approach to human and non-human
research has, in some cases, placed
them indirectly in competition for re-
sources and focus within the scientific
community, and so progress in one is
seen as a threat to continued progress in
the other.
The Path to Full Cooperative
Neuroscience: Computation,
Cross-Species Parallelism, and
Cross-Cultural Immersion
It follows that directly coordinated hu-
man-animal neuroscience should be a
key paradigm going forward. However,
for practical, philosophical, and sociolog-
ical reasons, human and non-humanwork
typically do not spontaneously merge.
Rather, achieving the necessary level of
interaction requires direct focus by the
scientific community to overcome signifi-
cant gaps in knowledge, resources, and
prejudicial attitudes. We highlight three
key areas where the necessary links can
be made: (1) computation, (2) cross-spe-
cies parallelism, and (3) cross-cultural
immersion.
Theory Is the Key: Next-Generation
Computational Models Blending
Algorithmic Insights and
Biophysically Precise Circuits
Computational theoretical neuroscience
typically occurs at one of many levels.
Models seek to understand the ‘‘nuts
and bolts’’ details of neurophysiology
in single cells, the dynamics among
multiple neurons and across circuits in
brain systems, or the computations
needed for perception, action, and
cognition at an abstract level. A formal
separation between these levels is
often assumed to be the appropriate
strategy when devising theory, given the
multiple ways computational and algo-
rithmic-level processes can be realizedand the fact that neurons and circuits,
and their emergent processes, are inter-
esting in their own right.
A fruitful new strategy is modeling that
formally combines these levels and/or
attempts to link across them (for detailed
discussion and review, see Frank, 2015).
These models are structured to test algo-
rithmic understanding, but seek to use
real details of the biology, to test whether
the computations proposed at the ab-
stract level can be performed by more
realistic circuits, loops, and hierarchies.
There are many advantages to this
approach. First, because such models
respect the algorithmic level, the predic-
tions theymake at themeso level are ideal
for guiding experimentation. Even if a
mouse is not capable of all the features
of complex human cognition that initially
motivated the model, the neural details
of the model that were necessary to
realize the algorithmic objective can
be tested in more precise ways. For
example, models of cortico-striatal loops
underlying working memory and hierar-
chical cognitive control functions in pri-
mates (e.g., Chatham and Badre, 2015)
can be used to guide and/or interpret
dissection of their implementational de-
tails in the mouse sensori-motor loop—
even if mice are not using this neural
architecture to apply complex abstract
rules or hierarchical executive control.
Second, details of the biology can pro-
vide clues to the algorithmic level. For
example, algorithmic models of reinforce-
ment learning (RL) inherited from com-
puter science and psychology suggest
that a key signal needed to drive learning
is a reward prediction error (the difference
between expected and obtained reward
value). These models motivated the sem-
inal discovery that phasic changes in
midbrain dopamine firing convey reward
prediction errors (Montague et al., 1996).
This finding overturned the previous the-
ory that dopaminergic signals were either
purely motor or purely reward related (as
opposed to an error signal needed for
learning) and has received converging
support across methods and species.
Nevertheless, the details of the neural
implementation of reward prediction error
have also reciprocally informed the algo-
rithmic level. A closer look at the biology
of the dorsal striatum reveals that this sys-
tem comprises two neural populationsNeuron 88,that respond in opponent ways to dopa-
mine (due to their differential expression
of D1 and D2 receptors) and that have dif-
ferential effects on action selection (due
to differential projections to distinct basal
ganglia output nuclei). Neural models that
incorporate these details predict a wide
variety of empirical effects of dopamine
manipulations on reward learning and
choice that are not accommodated by
classical RL models without such oppo-
nent processes (Collins and Frank,
2014). These model predictions have
been corroborated by pharmacological,
genetic, patient, and imaging studies in
humans, and more precise evidence for
the models’ proposed roles for separate
D1 and D2 populations have been
confirmed using optogenetic and other
genetic engineering methods (for review,
see Collins and Frank, 2014). These dy-
namic circuit models of corticostriatal in-
teractions have further facilitated a
connection between algorithmic models
of learning (typically concerned with dy-
namics across trials) and those of deci-
sion making (concerned with dynamics
of choice processes within trials). This
example illustrates how theoretical
neuroscience can provide a framework
for bidirectional interaction, providing
explanatory power at both levels.
Similar synergistic approaches across
levels have been successfully applied to
other aspects of decision making (attrac-
tors models and sequential sampling
models from mathematical psychology;
Wang, 2012), episodic memory (pattern
separation and completion in the hippo-
campus; O’Reilly and McClelland 1994),
and working memory (prefrontal cortical
gating networks and biophysical models
of active maintenance; Cohen et al.,
2002). All of these cases of bidirectional
interaction have led to advances in empir-
ical work across methods and species
while also allowing biophysical and func-
tional models to inform and refine each
other.
A crucial second target for computation
to link animal and human studies are
models focused on translating patterns
of biologically specific activity into the
signals measured in humans. As one
example, recent studies have provided
precise and formulated explanations for
magnetoencephalography (MEG) signals
based on details of the biophysics andDecember 2, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 857
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(Jones et al., 2007). Such ‘‘translators’’
provide a rational and mechanistic test
of whether the macro-neurophysiological
signatures observed in humans can be
generated by the detailed neural pro-
cesses observed in animal models.
Formal explanations for the neural drivers
of EEG and fMRI signals are further away,
though strong recent progress has been
made, and translators that solve for these
signals are similarly essential. This
requirement for the success of intersec-
tional neuroscience agrees with recent
calls for a research focus on determining
these solutions (Devor et al., 2013).
Building the Meso-Macro Mesh:
Explicit Alignment of Mouse,
Monkey, and Human Studies
Research in humans and animal models
must be intentionally aligned, so that
they can be mutually informative. First,
research must be directed to identify
strong functional homologies that are
supported by more than superficial
behavioral analogy. Since the cognitive
revolution in the late 20th century, we
have known that merely observing a
similar behavior between two species (or
even two individuals of the same species)
does not mean that the underlying pro-
cessing is the same. Nevertheless,
behavioral analogy is often the only bar
that ismet when linking human and animal
models, risking time and resources on
potentially irrelevant and idiosyncratic
lines of research. Thus, efforts should be
made to draw strong functional homol-
ogies between levels. As described
above, such homologies can occur at an
algorithmic level, whereby human and
animal models are aligned within a partic-
ular theoretical framework. The previously
described example of corticostriatal loop
models of working memory provides
such a case.
The use of parallel methods that allow
collection of identical types of data is
another means of drawing functional ho-
mologies. Neuroimaging methods are a
key focus, as many techniques driving
the meso-mouse revolution are not avail-
able in the human. Notable among these
is fMRI, a key engine of human cognitive
neuroscience and a method actively be-
ing pursued in monkeys and mice. By
conducting animal studies that parallel
human studies, we can directly test858 Neuron 88, December 2, 2015 ª2015 Elswhether the same areas or networks are
activated, and the same activity patterns
within them. If observed, such parallelism
goes a long way to substantiating the
inference that monkey electrophysiolog-
ical findings will apply in the human.
Similar fMRI studies can be conducted
in mouse, where the entire toolbox of
leading edge techniques, particularly op-
togenetic control, can be applied.
Advances in the analysis of complex
EEG and surface-potential signals simi-
larly offer an opportunity to draw func-
tional homologies in functional spectral
signatures between animals and humans.
The recent rapid progress in detailed and
systematic quantitative analysis of human
single-neuron and local field potential
recordings also provides a potentially
crucial translational tool. While these
data are only obtained in subjects with
advanced clinical symptomology, they
can provide a key bridge between levels,
in addition to providing an important
area in advancement of potential treat-
ment modalities.
Moving forward, research tools for
intersectional work require continuing in-
novations that allow us to test formal pre-
dictions and to provide a substrate for
functional homologies between systems.
For example, gains in temporal and
spatial resolution of human and non-hu-
man neuroscience methods (like primate
or mouse fMRI), as well as better under-
standing of convergent methods, will
permit focus on those functional signa-
tures that can guide non-human work.
Similarly, new statistical tools for handling
large datasets and formally testing com-
plex, biologically plausible computational
models would help leverage gains made
in formal theory and would increase the
range of testable hypotheses. Such paral-
lelism and inferences made from it require
deeper understanding of neuro-vascular
communication. This active field of
biological research will require the same
kinds of computational translational
‘‘solving tools’’ to allow micro-scale infer-
ences from the macro-scale fMRI signals
(Devor et al., 2013).
Just as advances in animal imaging can
help draw strong functional analogy be-
tween levels, human cognitive neurosci-
entists need to test frameworks that
make connection to biological principles
from animal studies. Human-level cogni-evier Inc.tive neuroscience has the ability to iden-
tify macro-level neural systems that
contribute to human cognitive or behav-
ioral function. Humans can perform tasks
that no other animal can perform, and
experiments involving humans leave
considerably less doubt about their rele-
vance to the human condition. Despite
their well-known limitations, the fact
that human neuroimaging methods, like
fMRI, EEG, andMEG, provide these types
of observations makes them indispens-
able to the progress of any neuroscience
of the human brain. A prominent neuro-
physiologist once quipped, ‘‘All fMRI
does is tell me where to put my elec-
trodes.’’ This comment was meant to be
diminishing, but it actually highlights the
great value in even the crudest degree of
systems-level knowledge about the hu-
man brain. Of course, at its best, modern
human cognitive neuroscience contrib-
utes much more than mere spatial locali-
zation (Poldrack and Farah, 2015).
Thus, an emphasis should be placed
on careful, task-based human cognitive
neuroscience research that is mecha-
nistically informed and derives, where
possible, from biologically grounded
theoretical frameworks or deeply analo-
gous animal research. The field of cogni-
tive neuroscience already has many
successful examples of this type of
research. As a few examples, investiga-
tion of pattern completion/separation pro-
cesses in the human hippocampus has
driven the discovery of parallels in animal
models (Yassa and Stark, 2011). fMRI
studies of short-term memory in humans
have complemented observations in ani-
mals indicating that individual items can
be maintained based on dynamic forms
of coding, as opposed to sustained delay
period activity (D’Esposito and Postle,
2015). The previously discussed working
memory gating mechanisms have derived
inspiration from understanding of cortico-
striatal motor systems and neurotrans-
mitter systems studied in animals, but
have tested crucial extensions of these
mechanisms to more complex forms of
cognitive control in human beings (Chat-
ham and Badre, 2015). Finally, the devel-
opment of techniques to test predictions
from computational models with fMRI,
so-called model-based fMRI, holds great
promise to both inform and be informed
by the hybrid models described above.
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man cognitive neuroscience are already
ongoing in certain sectors; we are encour-
aging their continued growth and wide-
spread emphasis.
Training the Next Generation: Fully
Integrated Immersion across Levels
We must train a new generation of neuro-
scientists that are question driven and not
technique limited. This generation should
be prepared to take full advantage of
data from multiple sources and levels
of analysis to address their research
hypotheses.
The first and most important step in
achieving this goal is to conceive of
training as centered around questions
rather than techniques or levels of anal-
ysis. Students should learn to propose
the best hypotheses they can, and then
find and use the methods that will allow
them to prosecute these ideas. This view
is in contrast to the notion that immersion
in a level of analysis is the only goal of
graduate education and that question-
driven inquiry and learning can be a sec-
ondary priority that simply occurs en
passant.
There are several implications that
accompany this shift in perspective.
Perhaps the most important implication
is that training serially in multiple labora-
tories should be an option fully available
to graduate and postdoctoral students.
Students should join labs for projects,
not necessarily for their educational life,
and be able to conduct projects serially
across different groups in the course of
a thesis or postdoctoral training period
as appropriate. The notion that an
advanced student is best trained by only
experiencing a single lab is provincial;
sampling multiple styles and levels of
analysis is a great way to not only achieve
an intersectionist perspective, but also
understand what approaches and ideas
will best suit that particular student in their
future career.
The most important shift to accommo-
date this goal is explicit funding mecha-
nisms that divorce students from the
indentured financial dependence of
exclusively single-lab and single-level-
of-inquiry mentorship, not just for a brief
period of ‘‘sampling’’ such as rotations,
but for an entire education. The one-lab/
one-level-of-analysis mentality perme-
ates graduate programs and is an almostobligatory paradigm of postdoctoral
training. While every student is unique,
promoting integration for a significant
number of students is important to the
future of neuroscience. Federal grants
should exist that will allow students the
lateral freedom to move between labora-
tories or facilitate collaborations across
them. Dedicating a portion of NRSA and
K-Award NIH grants to multi-lab mentor-
ship, and explicitly encouraging inte-
grated and multi-level training, would be
a major step in this direction.
This training is essential for generating
scientists who conduct their research
program at multiple levels themselves,
such as doing human and non-human
research or modeling at the biological
circuit and algorithmic levels. These indi-
viduals provide valuable links between
communities, but their training is neces-
sarily longer than that experienced by
the scientists working exclusively at the
human or non-human level.
Many graduate programs have ele-
ments that encourage such interactions,
including rotations aimed at providing
multi-level experience (not just auditions
for potential full-time participation in a
lab) and ‘‘boot camps’’ where several
kinds of experimentation are taught simul-
taneously for an intensive period to all
students. These efforts are laudable, and
we hope they are expanded on, in addi-
tion to the more overt support for detailed
and extensive training at multiple levels
described above.
In addition to the spontaneous interac-
tions across levels that accompany a
boot camp experience, programs should
be designed to encourage sustained con-
tact among scientists at different levels of
analysis. For a number of social and prac-
tical reasons, such contact rarely hap-
pens spontaneously. For example, the
degree to which human-level cognitive
neuroscientists and those pursuing
meso- to molecular-level neuroscience
have contact is highly variable across
training programs, particularly as scien-
tists in these disciplines are trained in
diverse graduate programs, ranging from
psychology to medicine to biology. This
limited understanding makes it difficult
for these scientists to incorporate com-
plex concepts gained from these disci-
plines into their own research programs.
One means of enhancing contact wouldNeuron 88,be to house graduate student and post-
doctoral offices outside the lab and orga-
nize students by theme or question rather
than laboratory.
In addition to the obvious need for
coursework at each level of analysis,
contact and sophistication across levels
can also be driven by individual courses
focused on specific questions and span-
ning levels, incorporating human, animal,
and computational principles. Examples
of topics that can be taught this way
might include reinforcement learning
theory, neural dynamics, decision mak-
ing, or memory models. Such teaching
will likely require multiple instructors
from different levels of expertise, and
the act of coordinating such courses is
in itself a driver toward interactionist prin-
ciples, as such collaboration in teaching
can often yield meaningful intellectual
exchanges and collaborations between
faculty.
A macro-level requirement needed to
meet each of these specific sub-goals is
a learning environment that is not only
borderless (allowing students to explore
beyond one lab), but a truly integrated
training program that spans from low-
level molecular models to high-level
cognitive science. Achieving this goal
might require a re-envisioning of graduate
education, away from the cantonization
that typifies many programs.
Conclusion
Recent advances in meso-level neurosci-
ence are both exciting and timely. The
next few years will see exciting discov-
eries emerge from a new focus on this
level of inquiry. However, when left
on their own, the molecular, systems
(meso), or human levels of neuroscience
will not spontaneously converge to pro-
vide understanding of complex human
functions as diverse as language, plan-
ning, emotion, decision making, and
memory. Innovation and progress must
evolve in interaction between these levels,
bridged by formal modeling and identifi-
cation of deep functional homologies.
Further, training the next generation of
neuroscientists must encourage open-
ness and sophistication at multiple levels
of analysis. The strategy of waiting for
connections between levels to spon-
taneously emerge is not a viable one;
if we seek the deepest and richestDecember 2, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 859
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NeuroViewunderstanding of human brain function,
we need to actively commit to synergy.
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